ABSTRACT Mobile crowd sensing (MCS) is becoming a popular paradigm to collect information, which has the potential to change people's life. However, MCS is vulnerable to security threats due to the increasing reliance on communication and computing. The challenges of unique security and privacy caused by MCS include privacy protection, integrity, confidentiality, and availability. To tackle these issues concurrently, we present the design of a dynamical credibility assessment of privacy-preserving (CAPP) strategy, a novel credibility assessment-based solution to protect privacy in opportunistic MCS, which is able to cope with malicious attacks and privacy protection even against intelligent MCS entities. In CAPP, the sensing data are dynamically split into slices and the number of slices is based on the trust of encountered nodes. Specially, node trust is assessed in two dimensions including the quality of contribution trust and social trust, which indicates how likely a node can fulfill its functionality and how trustworthy the relationship between a node and other nodes will be, respectively. Moreover, the secret sharing scheme and an anonymous strategy ensure the data integrity and the anonymity of participants. The effectiveness in privacy protection and efficiency of the proposed scheme are validated through theoretical analysis and numerical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the impulse of city informatization and rise of data science, mobile crowd sensing is becoming the new idea and practice for the future development of cities globally [1] , [2] . Through dynamically monitoring, analyzing and utilizing the data collected from various parts of the city, the thorough perception of urban living environment and comprehensive control of urban resources can be achieved [3] . The quantity and quality of collected data is crucial for the accurate urban status analysis. In MCS, intelligent sensors embedded in mobile terminals, wearable devices and other portable electronic equipment can collect various sensing data and upload the data to the processing platform through the cellular network or short distance wireless modular such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc. Then, the intelligent data extraction, analysis and other large-scale and complex social perception missions can be executed by the platform. Currently, MCS has been widely used in the intelligent traffic detection [4] , [5] , environment detection [6] , smart healthcare [7] , [8] , social network [9] etc.
The data forwarding process of conventional MCS technology largely depends on the infrastructure, where the existing cellular and other wireless network resources are usually utilized by nodes to transmit data. However, the realtime data transmission and the network connectivity can be severely influenced by the node movements [10] . Besides, the collected multimedia sensing data are usually large and transmitting them on the cellular communication network can cause excessive cellular resources consumption, which will reduce the enthusiasm of participants and increase the traffic load of the cellular network. To avoid the above-mentioned heavy resource consumption, the opportunistic sensing mode is introduced, which can fully exploit the high distribution density and encounter probability of mobile terminals. As a result, the anytime and anywhere sensor collaboration and data sensing in cities can be achieved in a cost efficient manner [11] . Compared with the infrastructure-based MCS, the opportunistic sensing can effectively reduce the infrastructure management, maintenance costs, and network load in dense areas [12] .
Supported by the opportunistic sensing, the system environment of the MCS is more open where nodes can voluntarily upload sensing data by relying on auto-registered mobile networks and public networks [13] , [14] . However, during the continuous data transmission process, the sensing data and node privacy are easily exposed to the relay nodes and channel monitor, which greatly increases the risks of hacker attacks and confidential leakage [15] . Besides, compared to other sensing networks, the human is involved in MCS and it consists of intelligent entities which may be controlled by malicious holders to launch attacks. Therefore, MCS sensing platform is untrusted to a certain extent on account of collecting the data along with some private personal information, which can be processed through data mining to obtain a lot of valuable information. Once the platform is compromised, the attacker can obtain all the personal information.
At the same time, there is an inherent conflict between privacy protection and data integrity in opportunity MCS. Under the protection of anonymous strategy, once the node identity is hidden, malicious participants can arbitrarily submit false data or tamper with the data from other participants, which reduces the data integrity and the system performance. Hence, it is nontrivial to simultaneously address privacy preserving and data integrity.
Considering the importance of trust as an important measure of participant relationship, trust can directly correspond to the participant privacy level, and there are significant social relationship among participants [16] , including the social attributes and social trust, which can be employed to achieve the reliable data transmission and to avoid malicious attacks [17] . Nevertheless, compared with typical social networks, social behaviors of the MCS participants are very complicated and the relationship is loose, uncertain and intermittent [18] , [19] . Hence, it is necessary to explore the essential attributes of various social attributes. The traditional social attribute quantifying methods cannot be applied to MCS due to the dynamic features [20] .
Targeting at the above problems, CAPP exploits the social trust characteristics of MCS, and a privacy preserving strategy based on the dynamic trust relationship evaluation is proposed, where a global trust evaluation model is established to select a reliable transmission path for the collected data. The privacy of node identity, sensing data and trust relationship all can be effectively protected.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Through the dynamic evaluation of social relationship and data quality, a global trust evaluation model is proposed to eliminate the influence of maliciously submitted false data. Meanwhile, a plurality of virtual identity information can be allocated to participants to hide the identities through the many-to-one mapping relationship. Further, the blind signature technique is exploited to deal with the social trust relationship among participants, so as to avoid the privacy leakage caused by the trust parameter quantification.
• The multi-path transmission is employed to gather the sensing data and to hide the original data and the source identity; moreover, the threshold of secret sharing is introduced to achieve the tradeoff between privacy preserving and data integrity.
• A dynamic message splitting method based on trust relationship is designed to ensure the data privacy, integrity and verifiability. Furthermore, through the distributed message splitting method and the reasonably selected data transmission path, the possibility of eavesdropped and leaked privacy information is dramatically reduced. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The related works are introduced in Section II. Section III describes the intelligent MCS entity and attack model. The global trust evaluation model and the privacy preserving trust sensing strategy are introduced in Section IV and V, respectively. Section VI introduces the data transmission strategy with privacy protection. The numerical results and security performance analysis are described in detail in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII summarizes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
At present, some researchers have report their findings below on the privacy protection of MCS.
In [21] , trusted third-party node were used to verify the information uploaded by the participants. Through the establishment of various private and shared keys among the participants, the global public key can remove the association between participants and the server, and the MAC address conversion and network coding are considered to prevent IP address attacks.
Based on the expansion of Merkle tree, the privacy protection mechanism in [22] can control the other leaf nodes of the Merkle tree, authenticate participants anonymously without the trusted third-party. The proposed mechanism effectively realizes incentive schemes under the anonymous mechanism and avoids the single-point failure of the trusted third-party, the revealed data content of participants and the malicious attacks. In addition, [23] establishes trust between entities by adopting Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and Transport Layer Secure protocol (TLS), and realizes privacypreserving entity communication protocol by using Private Information Retrieval techniques (PIR). However, the above mechanisms do not consider data forgery attacks and an attacker can send error reports legally, which reduces the accuracy of the system and affects the performance of the system.
Reference [24] exploits the time-domain data transmission delay to achieve the data privacy protection. Firstly, the data is VOLUME 6, 2018 fragmented and the forwarding nodes are randomly selected to transmit the data slices to the sensing platform, thus the data processing server and the source nodes are separated to prevent the server from deducting the trueness and identity of participants. In the data transmission process, the participants are assigned with pseudonyms dynamically. The proposed algorithm can balance the relationship among security, delay rate and delivery rate. However, cutting off the connection between the source node and destination node completely makes the node evaluation impossible, resulting in the system performance degradation. Reference [25] designed a data privacy protection method especially for the untrusted server. The data are divided into multiple slices and forwarded to neighbor participants. The carrying participants send the fragment information directly to the server when the hop count reaches the threshold. However, the above-mentioned literatures simply distribute the data slices randomly to neighbor nodes. During the data transmission process, attackers can easily collect the data slices, resulting in a significantly increasing data leakage probability. Besides, the malicious participants can discard the data slices, which severely affects the data integrity.
Relevant studies have shown that the malicious behavior of nodes in MCS has a significant impact on network performance. In order to improve network performance under the anonymous system, trust management, as an effective security mechanism, can significantly resist the malicious behavior of nodes. Reference [26] proposed a privacy protection policy based on trust management and designed the trust classification levels of participants and privacy information sensitivity levels, where the platform cannot deduce the node identity when evaluating node behaviors. Eventually, the anonymity of the participants credibility assessment, privacy protection and data trust management can be achieved. Reference [27] proposed a strategy for calculating the level of participants through trust and competence. In the process of participant selection, the reliability of the trust transfer path and privacy leakage probability are taken into consideration as selection criteria, so as to realize the purpose of selecting high-quality participants under the premise of privacy protection. But the hierarchical trust structure cannot accurately reflect the trust status of participants, and the fixed threshold cannot meet the requirements of the dynamic network.
In addition, the above-mentioned methods only encrypt or hide the collected data and privacy information, ignore the data loss and data tampering caused by malicious attacks. Because massive data are collected in MCS for processing and analysis, the data volume determines the performance of MCS to a certain extent. In this paper, a privacy protection method balancing the privacy protection strength, system performance and data integrity, along with the data processing algorithm, are designed to achieve data recoverability and verification. Besides, the quality of the perceived data is evaluated to eliminate the impact of collected error data.
III. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
MCS mainly includes three entities: task initiator, mobile participant nodes and sensing platform. The task initiator is responsible for issuing a specific task, and each task has the clear data type requirement and perception cycle. After obtaining the sensing data, the participant node sends the data to the sensing platform according to the social relationship between the nodes and the temporary connection during the movement process. The sensing platform is responsible for registering participants and collecting, evaluating and analyzing sensing data.
Traditional sensing platform in MCS stores both the identities and other information of nodes, including public data and sensitive data, which are vulnerable to attacks. In this paper, the sensing platform consists of two parts according to the functions: (1) Trust management Center (TC): Responsible for node registration and trust management; (2) Reporting service Center (RC): Responsible for data validation, integration and evaluation. TC and RC are controlled by confidentiality agreements and cannot be conspiring to ensure that, if any of them is compromised, the attacker cannot get the sensitive information and the node privacy cannot be inferred from the information fragments.
The system architecture is shown in Fig. 1 .Through the anonymous strategy, the task requester applies for the task to t RC, and then RC announces the task status to the nodes in the network. After receiving the announcement, the node selects a task that it is interested in. The node uses a pseudonym to apply for participation in the task to ensure that the system does not know the type of task the node participates in. After the node applies for successful participation in the task, it uses the real identity to obtain its own current reputation value from TC to construct a blind identity. During the data transmission process, the sensing node first detects the trustworthiness of the neighbor nodes. Based on the trust assessment, the sensing node completes the data splitting based on the number of trusted nodes. Finally, RC synthesizes and evaluates the collected data slices, and feeds back the evaluation results to TC, thereby updating the participating node's reputation value.
B. THREAT MODELS
All of the existing solutions to privacy protection assume that one of the above three entities has potential attacking behaviors. Obviously, this kind of hypothesis is too idealistic for practical MCS. In order to avoid loss of generality, the attackers in this paper are not aimed to functional entities. The attacker can be a sensing node, a task initiator or even the sensing platform.
A malicious task initiator can launch a special task for a small number of nodes, control the number of participating nodes, and greatly reduce the difficulty of acquiring node identities. For instance, such malicious task initiators can start a task for specific regions, or spread infectious diseases. Once the node participates in the sensing task, its location information and sensitive information are revealed, namely the narrow tasking attacks [21] . The attacker can also be a legitimate participant node in the network. During a task, the attacker can submit an error report, namely the data forgery attacks. In addition, it can cheat normal nodes by using high quality service to obtain trust, then provide inferior service like discarding data with a certain probability, namely the data dropping attacks. Besides, malicious nodes collude with each other to steal the privacy data of participating nodes and destroy the data integrity, namely the collusion attacks. At the same time, the attacker obtains the relevant information of the participating nodes and the sensing data from the sensing platform either online or offline. Based on the multiple sensing reports and the submission time from the same node, the attacker deduces the node privacy information, namely the inference attacks [13] , resulting in the system information disclosure.
C. SECURITY GOALS
Our security goals are as follows :
(1) Node identity privacy: The node uses anonymous identity, and the identity information is unobservable during the sensing process. More specifically, The task initiator issues a sensing task for a given node and other entities do not know whether the node is participating in the task. When a node uploads the available sensing data, other entities, including the RC and TC, are not allowed to obtain the node identity of the submitted data, because the data may contain node privacy information such as the time, geographic location, etc. namely the decoupling of the relationship between the sensing node and uploaded data.
(2) Trust relationship privacy: The social relationship list of nodes has to be protected from leakages to the sensing platform and neighbor nodes when evaluating the social trust between nodes. In addition, attackers cannot know the node identity by tracking the change of trust value.
(3) Data privacy: CAPP ensures that the captured data is unrecoverable by attackers. Besides, it provide necessary methods to identify the false data and tampered data to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and verifiability of the data.
IV. DYNAMIC TRUST EVALUATION
Trust of the node can be subjectively quantified in a specific environment and during a given period of time to evaluate the ability, security and credibility of nodes. Compared with security schemes based on the cryptosystem, the security scheme based on trust evaluation can effectively prevent the internal attack by legitimate nodes. In the context of opportunistic sensing, the encounter probability is usually employed to identify trusted relays. However, in a malicious environment, the encounter probability cannot actually reflect the node credibility, because malicious nodes can intercept the data in the network by arbitrarily exaggerating their encounter probabilities with other nodes. To effectively resist the attacks by malicious nodes, the historical sensing information of nodes are employed to evaluate the node reliability. Furthermore, to prevent malicious nodes from providing high-quality services and wangling high trust values, the compound trust model of explicit and implicit social trust is proposed.
A. QoC TRUST QoC (Quality of Contribution) trust reflects the contribution, honesty and credibility of a given node. The quality of data is not only affected by the mobile terminal but also the malicious operation by the participant. With the purpose of avoiding malicious nodes submitting false data, CAPP evaluate the QoC trust by using the similarity between sensing data. Meanwhile, the QoC trust updating algorithm is designed to accelerate the trust value attenuation rate of nodes that launch malicious attacks and make it slow to increase the QoC trust. The result of the QoC evaluation would be signed and encrypted to ensure their confidentiality and legitimacy.
Q id is determined by the quality of sensing report q r and the number of negative sensing p. The positive sensing indicates that the node submitted real data to the RC, while the negative sensing indicates that the node maliciously submits the false or tempered data. According to the established architecture, q r is evaluated by RC. Since a single task can be executed by multiple nodes, RC can quantify the data quality by calculating the similarity between all collected data. q r can be calculated by Eq. (1), where S r, r ∈ [−1, 1] is the similarity factor.
The higher the data similarity is, the closer the similarity factor is to 1; otherwise it is closer to −1. |Sum r | is the total number of reports collected by RC. A larger |Sum r | means the more nodes are involved in the task, namely the higher data accuracy and the more precise trust evaluation. Eventually, q r ∈ [−1, 1] can be obtained, where q r > 0 denotes that the node is positive sensing, and q r < 0 denotes the node is negative sensing. Then the RC uses its own private key s rk to sign q r and uses public key p tk of TC to encrypt it.
The positive sensing gets a positive feedback f + r , whereas the negative sensing gets a negative feedback f − r . The transmission process of f r exploits the anonymous strategy and conceals the node privacy information. The feedback is sent to the node by RC, and then send it to TC for QoC trust update after being anonymously processed by the node.
When TC receives f r , the signature validity is firstly verified and then decrypted with s tk . When the node is positive sensing, TC will increase the QoC trust of the node according to Eq. (3) and the magnitude of the increase was positively correlated with the evaluation f r + .
Q id is the current trust value, increment = f + r · α, and α > 1 is the increment factor. For the minimum Q id = 0, the new trust value Q id is minimum 0 < 1 − 1 1+ < 1; when Q id = 1, the maximum Q id is 1. When increment takes the minimum value, Q id = Q id . Therefore Q id ∈ (Q id , 1).
In the case of negative feedback, the trust management center records the number of malicious behaviors for each node to punish the malicious nodes. The more malicious behaviors lead the larger QoC trust value attenuation rate, which is updated by Eq. (4):
Q id reflects the current trust value. Increment = |f − r |·α p , denotes the total number of node malicious behaviors with increasing factor α > 1. The larger the increment factor α is, the greater the impact of malicious behaviors is on the reputation value Q id . In the extreme case Q id = 0, the new trust value reaches 0. When Q id = 1, the maximum Q id is 0 < 1 1+ < 1, Thus the new trust value Q id ∈ (0, 1). When the increment takes the minimum value 0, Q id = Q id . Therefore Q id ∈ (0, Q id ).
B. SOCIAL TRUST
According to the above-mentioned process, the calculation of QoC trust depends on the history information of MCS nodes. Obviously, malicious nodes can wangle the high node trust by providing the high-quality service to further attack the network. Therefore, the essential reliability judgment based on QoC is vulnerable. As a human-centered sensing network, a few trusted friend nodes exist in MCS. The transmission security among friend nodes can be extremely guaranteed. And every node has its own social attributes.
The trust between nodes can be evaluated according to their social attributes without the historical sensing information. Therefore, In order to solve the unreliability caused by relying solely on QoC assessment, based on the QoC trust, CAPP exploits the social relationship between nodes to evaluate the social trust between nodes so that the request node can obtain the trust degree of the encountered node. According to the source, the social trust is divided into explicit social trust and implicit social trust.
Explicit Social Trust (Etrust) refers to the node itself explicitly express the trust value. Etrust between two nodes is established through the node manually identifying its friends in social reality or in a social network. And the transitivity of trust in the relational chain is considered in CAPP. The trust relationship learned locally by the node n a can be formally represented as a directed tree G F with the node n a as the root node, where the weight of the edge represents the normalized trust value in the range [0, 1]. This relationship model is consistent with the direction, asymmetry and transitivity of trust. If the encountered node is a friend, they exchange and update relationship list. The explicit trust value of n a and n b can be calculated by Eq. (5), as shown at the bottom of this page.
When the edge weight value between n a and n b are not equal to 0, that means n a and n b have the direct relationship with the same friend, and the Etrust from n a to n b is w n a ,n b ∈ [0, 1]. When the value of the associated edge weight is 0, there is no direct trust relationship between n a and n b . In this case, indirect trust is used to calculate the Etrust between them. BFS H max represents the maximum trust transfer distance calculated by the Breadth-First-Search algorithm [28] . Hop(n a , n b ) denotes the number of hops between n a and n b . The trust value continuously attenuates as the number of hops increases.
Based on the evaluation, the explicit social trust has the higher reliability, but it is restrained by the ability of nodes and the number friend nodes. The nodes encountered during the sensing process may be unfamiliar nodes who are not previously encountered. To solve the trust evaluation for such nodes, the trust state is obtained by analyzing the association between the multi-dimensional social attributes of nodes.
Implicit Social Trust (Itrust) refers to a quantitative representation of the trustworthiness for stranger nodes based on social attributes. The existing trust evaluation methods usually employ multiple social attributes of nodes through fixed formula and predefined parameters. However, the association between multiple attributes is often ambiguous and uncertain, and the predefined parameters can hardly describe this association. Obviously, a malicious node can increase the social trust of other nodes by forging social attributes. For the sake of avoiding such forgery, CAPP adopts the data mining algorithm to analyze the correlation between the social attributes of nodes in the evaluation process. Furthermore the social trust of unfamiliar node is estimated rely on the correlation.
We adopt a normalized social attribute vector user(n a ) = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a h ) , where a k represents the quantified value of the k-th node attribute in the relational graph, which is stored locally by the nodes and used as samples for training. Let the node attribute vector be the input and the corresponding Etrust as the output, we can obtain the sample training set by the decision function, as shown in Eq. (6):
w is the weight vector and b is deviation constant. For the better generalization ability, the least squares support vector machine [29] is used by Eq. (7), according to the Structural Risk Minimization (SRM) criterion [30] .
Where J denotes the loss function, γ > 0 denotes the adjustable penalty coefficient, namely the model balance coefficient, and e i denotes the error between the regression function value and the actual value. Through the training of samples, the decision function Ist(n a:i ) can be obtained. Each node in MCS exploits the locally stored information to train, and the feature decision function can be obtained after the training. During the sensing process, nodes exchange social attributes with each other, and input them into the decision function, so as to obtain the implicit social trust value.
V. TRUST-DRIVEN PRIVACY PROTECTION A. IDENTITY PROTECTION
The task type, data submission time and data content are exploitable information for the attacker in the process of performing sensing tasks. The attacker can deduce node privacy from these information. Meanwhile, it is extremely easy to cause the privacy leakage of node social relationship during the trust evaluation process. Therefore, to avoid the privacy disclosure, an anonymous strategy which using many to one mapping relationship is proposed in CAPP for task application and data submission, including pseudonyms and blind identities.
Pseudonym is a pseudo-identity for a node to request a task and is not associated with its true identity. Therefore, the participating tasks of nodes can be hidden to prevent narrow task attacks.
After joining the network, a node registers its own real identity ID at the TC and applies for the pseudonym seed from the TC. The TC first verifies whether the node has multiple pseudonyms. If so, the pseudonym legitimacy of the node is questioned to avoid the Sybil Attack. After the verification, TC returns the node a seed τ = H(sign TA ||N id ), where sign TA represents the signature of TC and N id is the true node identity. The seed is employed to represent the legitimacy of the pseudonyms randomly generated by nodes. A pseudonym is generated by a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) as shown in Eq. (8), where h denotes a length-matched hash generating function.
Blind Identity is constructed by blind signature algorithm [31] which is the identity of node during the task sensing process. Blind Identity can not only achieve hiding the node identity, but also prevent the anonymous strategy being exploited by malicious nodes to hide the attack behavior.
According to the QoC trust evaluation method described in Section IV, the node gets a feedback from the RC after each sensing task. With the anonymous strategy, the malicious node can intentionally retain positive feedback on the positive sensing and send it to the TC to enhance the QoC trust. For avoiding this behavior, the blind signature algorithm is employed to construct the blind identity which including the node QoC trust and a blind factor, as shown in Eq. (9) .
After the TC receives the feedback information, it firstly compares the reported QoC trust with the locally stored trust value. If they are equal, the QoC trust is further updated. Z is a blind factor randomly generated and only known by the node itself. The QoC trust value serves as the original identity to construct the blind identity N b to participate in tasks. After receiving the feedback information from the RC, the node can remove the blind factor from the feedback. To prevent malicious nodes from inferring the node identity by tracking the QoC trust value, the feedback is reported to the TC after a random delay.
Blind identity can effectively protect the scalability of anonymous nodes, however, its ability to resist inference attacks is weak. For honest-but-curious TC and RC, even if they are not colluding, they can technically match the blind identity and true identity through analyzing multiple reports submitted by nodes and QoC trust update status, especially for nodes using the same blind identities for the task application, data transmission and submission [32] . To effectively hide the privacy information, the pseudonym is adopted by nodes to apply for tasks, which can confuse attackers and greatly reduce the possibility of the privacy information being successfully inferred.
B. DATA PRIVACY PROTECTION
Based on the above-mentioned anonymous strategy, the identity privacy of nodes can be guaranteed. However, the node privacy can be compromised if malicious nodes obtain the space-time information related sensing data in MCS. To solve this problem, we design a trust-based data protection mechanism in CAPP. The (k, n) threshold secret sharing algorithm [33] is used and it can effectively exploit the multipath diversity and hide the original sensing data during the data transmission process. Considering the QoC trust value and social trust value of nodes, the number of slices can be dynamically controlled according to the set of trusted nodes to establish a secure transmission path for the source node, even if the malicious nodes can intercept some parts of the data, they cannot restore the original information. Therefore the data privacy in a dynamic network scenario can be protected.
1) TRUSTED NODES FILTERING
The threshold secret sharing mechanism can effectively resist the attack of a single malicious node, but there are often several malicious nodes are collusive to attack the network [34] . The threshold secret sharing mechanism cannot protect MCS against the conspiring attack. A source node forwards its sensing data to the encountered node and a malicious node only has to collect k original messages to launch the collusion attack. In this paper, the social trust value and QoC trust of nodes are employed to evaluate the node credibility and to select the trusted nodes for the source node. On one hand, it can avoid transmitting sensing data to malicious nodes. On the other hand, it can dynamically define the number of slices n according to the set of trusted nodes and the uncertainty of n and k, which increases the difficulty of restoring data and protects the data privacy.
According to the trust evaluation method described in Section 4, the trust states of nodes include the global QoC trust and the social trust. Observed from the perspective of the source node n a , nodes in the network can be divided into three types: friend nodes, indirect friend nodes and unfamiliar nodes. The trust value of a friend node is high and the trust relationship is stable, so all the friend nodes can be regarded as trusted nodes, which is denoted as the set N E 1 . For indirect friend nodes, the trust relationship between nodes will be weakened with the increase of hop count p. In theory, the less p is, the more credible the authority of the selected node is. Therefore, in order to guarantee the security of the nodes, this paper considers the indirect friend nodes with trust relationship in p hop as trusted nodes which is denoted as the set N E 2 .According to the node trust value in the set N E 1 and N E 2 , CAPP sets the trust balance value as a factor to measure the trustworthiness of the node as shown in Eq. (10) .
Here N E = N E 1 ∪ N E 2 . Besides, for node whose social relations are outside the hop p in the graph of n a , the node can also be regarded as a trusted node and store it in the set N E 2 if the node's explicit trust is greater than θ . In terms of unfamiliar nodes, their implicit social trust values and QoC trust values are taken as the comprehensive trust values. The comprehensive trust value of node n a in n b can be calculated by Eq. (11): (11) n b denotes the times of sensing, h(n a , n b ) denotes the number of common attributes owned by n a and n b , and the index of is higher than that of QoC trust h, which indicates that the impact of QoC trust on the comprehensive trust value is greater than that of the implicit social trust. If comprehensive trust value of the unfamiliar node satisfies Fturst > θ , the node is regarded as the trusted node and stored in the set N f . In this paper, we define and select the set of trusted nodes from the encountered nodes asN t = N e ∪ N f .
2) DATA SPLITTING, COMPOSITION AND VERIFICATION
Before the sensing data is forwarded, the trusted node set of the node is inquired at first. The system parameters M max and M min are the maximum and minimum number of slices,respectively. If the number of nodes in N e is greater than M max , all slices of the source node can find trusted nodes for forwarding. In this case,the number of slices is set to M max ; If M min < m < M max , to meet the minimum number of slices allowed by system, the number of slices set to m. And when the number of friends nodes satisfying the condition is too small, that is m < M min , the data slices need to be forwarded to some unfamiliar nodes, M min − m nodes with higher trust value are chosen as the forwarding node in the set N f , and the number of messages is M min .
The number of slices and the relay set N t = {N b1 , N b2 , . . . , N bn } can be determined by the source node n a , where N bi denotes the blind identity of nodes and N bi ∈ R q 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The source node randomly constructs a k-1 degree polynomial f (x) ∈ R q [x] , where data r is constant, k is the secret sharing threshold and a 1 , a 2 . . . a k−1 are the integers randomly selected by n a .
The source node n a then calculates data slice f (i) , i ∈ [1, n] for each node belongs to set N, and encrypts it with public key p rk from the RC. Afterwards, the data slices are sent to each node in set N. To prevent malicious nodes from tampering with the data to reduce the system performance. CAPP guarantees the verifiability of the data by exploiting the hash value. A suitable hash algorithm can map arbitrary length data to different values of fixed length, which is not reversible. A one-way hash algorithm can be used to compute the corresponding hash value h(r) for each collected sensing data. During the data forwarding process, the encrypted h(r) is included in the data packet and sent to the RC. The RC then restores the original report r according to all the received data slices and it can also calculate a hash value h(r ). If h(r ) = h(r), it indicates that the uploaded report has not been tampered. Otherwise the RC will discard the restored report.
The format of forwarding data packet is shown in Table 2 includes identification and content. The identification consists of four parts, which are used by report service center to restore data. The first part is the hash value, the second part is the minimum number of data pieces required for data recovery, the third part is the identification of the each data slice to prevent malicious nodes from collecting the same data packet header, and the fourth part is the blind node identity with QoC trust value used by RC to check the packer legitimacy. The identification and content in this packet are encrypted with public key p rk by the source node. The relay nodes also use blind identities to avoid exposing the social relationship. When RC received the packets, it firstly decrypts the received data packet with private key s rk . If the first two parts of the identification are same, data slices can be regarded as having the same source report. Then RC checks the number of data slices from the same source report,if the number is greater than k, the data slices can be used to restore the source data report. The data composition algorithm can be described as follows:
Without loss of generality, the collected data slices are (i, f (i)) and i = 1, 2, . . . , k. According to the Lagrange Interpolation Formula, the k-polynomial L j (x) can be calculated by Eq. (13), where j = 1, 2, . . . , n, I j = {1, 2, . . . , j, . . . , k}.
is n − 1 polynomial and satisfies ∀i ∈ I j L j (x) = 0 and L j x j = 1.
Let x = 0, the original data r' = f (0) can be obtained to calculate h(r ), and h(r) = h(r ) means the successful data recovery. VOLUME 6, 2018
VI. DATA TRANSMISSION MECHANISM WITH PRIVACY PROTECTION
In this paper, the anonymous strategy and data partitioning are employed to design a data forwarding mechanism with privacy protection. The trust management center generates public key P tk and private key S tk to encrypt the trust information. The report service center generates public key P rk and private key S rk to encrypt the relay link and data reports. The detailed procedures are as follows.
Step 1 Task Assignment: Firstly, the task initiator reports a sensing task to the RC, and RC can then announce the task in the network. After receiving the task announcement, nodes can choose interested tasks to participate in. The pseudonyms are utilized by nodes to participate in the task and to hide the task types.
When participating in a task, the node uses true identity ID to request the current QoC trust value from the TC and then generates blind identity N b to perform the task.
Step 2 Report Submission: Source node segments the sensing data according to the proposed mechanisms in Section V. First, evaluate the trust status of the encountered nodes. In the first round, the node inquires whether there is any information about the encountered nodes in its own stored relational graph. If so, store the encountered nodes within p hops in the set N E 1 . Then judge whether the number of the nodes in N E 1 is larger than the minimum number of pieces. If satisfied, stop the query. Otherwise, start the second round of queries. The explicit social trust of the encountered node is evaluated and if it is larger than trust balance value, the node can be stored in the set N E 1 . After the query, re-judge the number of nodes in the set N E 1 . If the number of the nodes in N E 1 is larger than the minimum number of pieces, stop the query. Otherwise, start the third round of queries. Evaluate the implicit social trust of the unknown node, and the final trust of the node is obtained according to Eq. (11) . If the final trust is greater than the trust balance value, the node is regarded as the trusted node and stored in the set N E 2 . After the query, judging whether the number of nodes in the set satisfies larger than the minimum number of pieces. If so, data splitting according to the above-mentioned segmentation rules (Section 5.2). Then transmit the data slices to the encountered nodes using the blind identity. If not, continue waiting or task failed.
Step 3 Report Evaluation: Upon receiving data reports, RC evaluates them and sends the feedback fr to the source node andR denotes the evaluation result. The RC encrypts the feedback message with public key P tk from TC, which can effectively prevent malicious nodes from modifying the feedback.
Step 4 Trust Evaluation and Update: The node removes the blind factor from Message and then uploads it to the TC using the real ID to update the QoC trust.
Pseudo-code of the data transmission mechanism with privacy protection is shown in Algorithm 1: if node i participates in a task then 5: Acquire QoC for node i; 6: end if 7: end if 8: node i starts sensing and collects data r and waits for; 9: the enough number of encountered nodes in Set 11: node i starts Data Slice Algorithm and sends the packet to N b and flag =true; 12: else 13: flag=false and task failed; 14: end if 15: if flag == ture and RC waits for at least k data slices for i then 16: restore data r ; 17: if h(r) = h(r ) then 18: Evaluate r and return fr(r) to node i; 19: else 20: task failed; 21: end if 22: end if 23: if node i received the f(r) then 24: delete the blind fator; 25: if TC Verify the fr is OK then 26: TC Updates the QoC; 27: end if 28: end if 29: END
VII. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION

A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section discusses how the privacy preserving goals are achieved.
1) ANONYMITY OF IDENTITY AND TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Nodes in MCS use pseudonyms to apply for tasks. The TC only knows the pseudonym seeds instead of the true identities, and the pseudonyms can be generated by the pseudo-random sequence. The pseudonym information will not be revealed to a third party,and the sensing platform cannot perceive the task participating status of nodes.
Blind identities are utilized to participate in sensing tasks and to interact with other nodes, including exchanging social attributes and relationships with each other. Because CAPP considers the friend nodes in real life, the blind identity will not cause confusion and can effectively prevent the malicious nodes from obtaining the social relationships. The blind identities are constructed by the QoC trust value and blind factor only known by the node itself, where the QoC trust value is the global trust value. Although the TC stores the true node identities and corresponding QoC trust values, it cannot obtain the blind identities, because RC does not communicate with the TC and TC updates the QoC trust value according to the feedback information uploaded by nodes with the real IDs. The curious TC cannot obtain the blind factors of nodes from true trust values, which can prevent malicious nodes and the curious sensing platform from inferring the true node identities.
2) DATA PRIVACY
Thanks to the features of the (k, n) threshold secret sharing algorithm, a single captured data slice will not damage the node privacy. If a malicious node obtains the data piece and discards it, the RC can still restore the original data as long as it receives at least k data pieces. If malicious nodes launch a conspiring attack, the RC cannot recover the data, because the value of n and k are dynamically set and not related in this paper. The value of n is determined by the set of trusted nodes around the source node, with a certain randomness, and the value of k is determined by the node. After being encrypted, k is stored in the identification part of the packet and only the node itself and the RC know it. As mentioned in Section V-B, even if malicious nodes collect enough data slices, they cannot restore the real data without knowing k.
In order to more intuitively reflect the security and robustness of the proposed strategy, CAPP deduces and quantifies the privacy leakage probability of data. In this paper, the number of data slices has been set by the number of trust nodes and the system parameters. Meanwhile the number of trust nodes is related to the social characteristics of source node n a and network environment. When the number of friend nodes N E 1 is greater than M min , the data slices are all carried by the friends of n a . If N E 1 is greater than M max , the number of data slices is M max , and the privacy leakage probability of the data in this case is represented by Eq. (20) , as shown at the bottom of the next page. On the contrary, the number of data slices is M max and the privacy leakage probability is represented by Eq. (21), as shown at the bottom of the next page. Where µ i is a subjective factor which represents the subjective degree of n a when evaluating the trust of encountered nodes. With the less subjectivity, the measurement of a trust value is more accurate and it is more accurate to identify the malicious node.
When the number of direct friend nodes of the source node N E 1 is less than M min , the number of indirect friend nodes N E 2 needs to be considered If N E 2 is greater than M min − N E 1 , then the data slices are all carried by their direct friends and indirect friends. In this case, if the sum of N E 1 and N E 2 is greater than M max , the number of data slices is M max , and the privacy leak probability is as shown in Eq. (22), as shown at the bottom of the next page. Otherwise, the number of data slices is N E 1 +N E 2 , and the privacy leak probability is as shown in Eq. (23), as shown at the bottom of the next page. Where N E 2 is a set of indirect friends, the more hops experienced by indirect friends is, the more the trust fades, caused by indirect trust. In this paper, p ε represents the interval hop.
When the sum of the number of direct friends and indirect friend nodes N E 1 +N E 2 is less than M min , it needs to forward the data slices to some unknown nodes. In other words, N E 1 +N E 2 − m nodes with higher trust value are selected in the set N f as the forwarding nodes Although the nodes have high trust value with the source node, the expected probability of taking malicious action on the data is larger than that in the set N E 1 +N E 2 because of the non-friend property with the source node and the dynamic nature of the node behavior attribute. Therefore, the dynamic malicious factor is defined as β λ ,where β λ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the behavioral uncertainty of the unknown node. In this case, the probability of privacy disclosure in this case is shown in Eq. (24), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
Through the above analysis, the expected privacy leakage probability of the sensing data is obtained, as shown in Eq. (25) , as shown at the bottom of the next page.
B. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this part, the Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) [35] is employed to validate the proposed mechanism and to evaluate its impact on the network performance through comparing the data privacy protection algorithm of DAPP [24] and PDA [25] . DAPP used a traditional splitting algorithm for data protection, while PDA used a group management algorithm to integrate privacy data. The performance indexes include the data exposure rate, data delivery rate and data delivery delay. To objectively evaluate the privacy protection ability, Infocom06 data set is used as node trajectories, which is established during the Infocom06 conference in Barcelona with 80 volunteers involved. Each volunteer carried a mobile device with the Bluetooth interface, which records the encounters with other participants during the meeting. The whole process lasted 3 days, and the trajectories of nodes can accurately reflect social characteristics and relationships.
1) CHANGES OF QoC TRUST
In the simulation, the initial QoC trust is set to 0.5, and nodes in MCS are classified into three types according to their behaviors: positively sensing nodes, negatively sensing nodes and semi-negatively sensing nodes. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that, the node is always active from 0 to 16h and its QoC trust increases slowly from 0.5 to 0.8. When a node is always negatively sensing, its QoC trust value decreases rapidly and it only takes 4h for the QoC trust value to drop from 0.5 to 0.1. When a node is semi-negatively sensing, although its QoC trust value rises and falls, the long-term QoC trust trend is downward, because the proposed QoC trust update mechanism punishes the negatively sensing behaviors. The more negatively sensing behaviors lead to the more dramatically dropping QoC trust value.
2) IMPACT OF SOCIAL TRUST ON THE CREDIBILITY
The forged or tampered social attribute values by malicious nodes are also considered in the simulation to evaluate the impact of social trust on the node credibility. 20% of the nodes in MCS network are assumed to be malicious, and malicious nodes are positively sensing most of the time. Fig. 3 illustrates the difference between employing the social attributes and QoC trust based node evaluation method and employing only the QoC trust based node evaluation method. Obviously, if the node reliability is evaluated only according to the QoC trust, the probability of a malicious node having a trust value of 0.9 reaches 70%, mainly because the malicious node is positively sensing most of the time. Contrarily, if the node reliability is evaluated comprehensively according to social attributes and QoC trust, the trust degree of ordinary node to malicious node is the uncertain and nearly 60% of the normal nodes have low trust for the malicious node and. Apparently, the social trust involved evaluation can help normal nodes to make decisions more accurately.
3) PRIVACY PROTECTION AND NETWORK PERFORMANCE
The simulation thoroughly verifies the privacy protection methods including the global QoC trust evaluation, social trust evaluation, dynamic data splitting, and compares its network performance and message protection utilization with the classic XOR, DAPP and PDA. Firstly, in order to verify the accuracy of the theoretical analysis of this paper, different splitting methods were simulated. Fig. 4 depicts the relationship between the message exposure rate and the proportion of malicious nodes in the network with 78 nodes. The malicious nodes randomly launch colluding attacks or data dropping attacks. Since the proposed mechanism dynamically determines the values of n and k with the assumption that k is possibly known by malicious nodes. Taking the impact of the number of slices n on the message exposure rate into account, we also consider whether a malicious node is conspiring: if two malicious nodes meet, they swap each other's data message that is intercepted from the normal node. Without the data encryption, Fig. 4 indicates that, when the data is not sliced, the message exposure rate is the highest, and the message exposure rate increases from 50% to 80% with the growing proportion of malicious nodes. Apparently, the data splitting can substantially reduce the message exposure rate, and the number of data slices leads to the different privacy level. For instance, the message exposure rate when n=2 is higher than that when n=3, because more data slices cause difficulty for malicious nodes to restore the original data. The message exposure rate of the proposed mechanism is the lowest, due to the dynamically determined the number of slices based on the social relationship and QoC trust during the data forwarding process, which can effectively prevent malicious nodes from intercepting the original data. Because multiple malicious nodes are conspiring to intercept the data slices, the data exchange among malicious nodes brings more opportunities to restore the original data. Fig. 5 illustrates the system performance of three privacy protection methods under various numbers of malicious nodes. The delivery rate is the percentage of successfully delivered messages. The average delay denotes the average time consumption of the successfully delivered messages. As shown in Fig. 5 , data splitting can notably improve the message delivery rate. As the proportion of malicious nodes increases, the delivery rate of CAPP is generally 22% higher than PDA, because RC has to receive all the data slices to recover the original data and the (k, n) threshold secret sharing mechanism can ensure the data recoverability even when VOLUME 6, 2018 some of the data slices are intentionally dropped by malicious nodes.Although CAPP processed the private data, the data may not be recovered due to interception by malicious nodes during transmission. 6 depicts the impacts of the percentage of malicious nodes on the average delays for the three mechanisms. The average delays of the PDA and DAPP mechanisms are relatively flat because these two mechanisms depends no specific evaluation on malicious nodes. When the proportions of malicious nodes are less than 25%, PDA has the lowest average delay, whereas the splitting mechanism has to collect all the data slices to restore information and thus has the higher average delay. With the increasing ratio of malicious nodes, the average delay of the proposed mechanism rises from 6750 to 8500, because nodes dynamically evaluate the credibility of encountered nodes and only choose reliable nodes as relays. It is time consuming for a source node in a malicious network environment to reliably report the sensing data. Even though the proposed privacy protecting data transmission mechanism incurs the relatively higher average delay, it achieves the better delivery rate and privacy protection performances for MCS.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To protect the privacy of the sensing data and nodes in MCS, we proposed a dynamic trust evaluation method with pseudonyms and blind identities. In the proposed mechanism, a reliable transmission path from the source node to the sensing platform is established, which can effectively avoid malicious attacks. Besides, the proposed mechanism requires no pre-established keys and does not depend on other security infrastructures. In addition, our proposed scheme can achieve the higher privacy protection by slicing messages, and the node credibility evaluation is dynamically enhanced by including social attributes. A multi-path data forwarding method is also employed to transmit the data slices to the RC, which can verify the node legitimacy and then restore the original message. Simulation results demonstrate the performance of the proposed privacy protecting data transmission mechanism.
